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Abstract
In the past decade many developing economies started to privatize their state
owned enterprises. Recently, however, this process seems to have slowed down
in some economies and have completely been stalled in others. Here we formalize the view that this is so because these enterprises are major instruments of
income redistribution and, in economies with signiÞcant degrees of income inequality, segments of the population that beneÞt from this redistribution would
use whatever political power they may have to oppose its abandonment. We Þnd
strong and robust empirical support for this hypothesis using cross-country data
on the relative size of the state-owned-enterprise sector and diﬀerent measures
of inequality. We also Þnd support for the propositions that dictatorships as
well as democracies use this redistributive tool and that left-wing governments
tend to redistribute more than right-wing governments through state owned
enterprises.
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Introduction

Recent years have witnessed a widespread attempt in developing countries to dismantle one of
their most entrenched institutions-the state owned enterprises (SOE’s). Some of these attempts
(for instance in Argentina) have been quite successful, others (for instance in Turkey) much less
so. This paper tries to formalize, in the simplest analytical terms possible, a popular, but as
yet informal, argument as to why some countries Þnd it very diﬃcult to privatize their SOE’s
and to test this argument empirically. Simply put, the argument is that the SOE sector has
become a major instrument of income redistribution especially for countries undergoing a taxing
structural adjustment. In the words of an acute observer writing about Turkey, ”...the privatization
drive...has lost its attractiveness to the extent that it would impede the state from using the SOE’s
to ease the pain of other components of the structural adjustment process.”1
The SOE’s owe their genesis to the adoption of strategies of import-substituting industrialization.2 In some cases these policies had been implemented quite early. For instance, in Turkey the
SOE sector dates back to the late 1920’s, in Mexico to the 1930’s, in India to the late 1940’s. In
most cases the common ostensible rationale for establishing SOE’s was that the private sector in
existence was weak, unable to compete with foreign goods or prone to the formation of alliances
with foreign capital to the detriment of national interests. It soon became clear to economists
and policy makers alike that the performance of the SOE sector left something to be desired:
SOE’s experienced chronic losses which resulted in rising domestic budget deÞcits and inßation.
The response was attempts at rationalizing and streamlining the SOE sector. This soon proved
impossible.
In order to explain why such attempts were doomed to fail from the start, we will focus in
what follows on two main factors that contribute to the losses commonly registered in the SOE’s:
1

See Waterbury (1992, p.194).
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The genesis of the SOE sector may in addition reßect the need for income redistribution. Waterbury (1993,
p. 263) stresses that “...the political logic that gave rise to the SOE sectors in the Þrst place [was] the need to
redistribute income...”
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high wages to SOE employees and “surplus labor”.3
First, a clariÞcation. When we say the SOE’s pay high wages we mean that the SOE’s typically
pay wages that are higher than those paid by private enterprises in a given country. It is frequently
the case that SOE’s are monopolies and labor unions negotiate high wages without fearing a
depression in wages caused by attraction of labor to SOE’s from competing private Þrms. The
SOE’s may also pay a compensating wage diﬀerential when they operate in locations where private
Þrms may be reluctant to locate. The full compensation package of the SOE’s may include superior
leave privileges and retirement beneÞts. Furthermore, even if wage rates in the SOE’s are similar
to the ones oﬀered by private Þrms, given the low productivity epidemic in the former, the ratio
of wages to marginal productivity of labor is higher. Finally, there is strong empirical evidence
from Latin America, Africa, and Southeast Asia that supports the observance that the SOE’s pay
high wages.4
Second, casual empiricism as well as careful empirical studies suggest that the SOE’s carry
”surplus labor”, that is, they employ more workers than their operations would justify on strictly
rational economic grounds. Thus, for instance, an oﬃcial study found that though the output of
the SOE’s in the Western and Mid-Western states of Nigeria remained unchanged in the period
1963-1967, the wages and salaries’ bill more than doubled.5

Complaints by management of

surplus workers in the SOE’s in Sri Lanka, Trinidad and Tobago, India, and Britain, inter alia,
are well documented.6
It is, therefore, not surprising that the SOE’s suﬀer from chronic losses given the wages they
pay and the surplus labor with which they operate. And, they do so because they are instruments
of income redistribution. Furthermore, this redistributive tool seems not to be shunned by governments either on the left or on the right (though as we show below not to the same extent),
3

The following discussion relies heavily on Ramanadham (1988).
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For the evidence see Ramanadham (1988), ch.2.

5

See the Report of the Conference on Public Enterprises in Nigeria (1970), cited in Ramanadham (1988).

6

See Ramanadham (1988).
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by governments democratic or dictatorial. Thus, for instance in Bolivia ruled by the left-wing
MNR (Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionaria) “[b]y the early 1960s a form of state capitalism
developed, controlled and exploited by various competing groups of the middle classes....[T]he
state enterprises became a source of enrichment for these private factions, some civilian and some
military.”7 Under the right-wing rule of General Hugo Banzer, who was installed as president
of Bolivia following a coup d’etat in August 1971, “...the public enterprises served frequently as
a mechanism to transfer state-owned (or state-guaranteed) resources to privileged groups in the
private sector. Access to government oﬃcials and government contracts were considered the most
important asset from the viewpoint of many private-sector businessmen.”8 Further, “[i]n fact, a
non-negligible part of the support for the Banzer government and succeeding military regimes was
the willingness to create employment in the public sector. The return to democracy in 1982 was
also accompanied by a big spurt in the expansion of jobs in the most important public enterprises,
particularly in COMIBOL.”9 When in 1970 the Mexican president Diaz Ordaz had to choose his
successor unilaterally, the new president “...Echeverria faced the diﬃcult task of creating his own
supporting coalition after assuming oﬃce.

The simplest method of shoring up the weakening

political consensus was to spend on everyone’s behalf: dole out subsidies to education and agriculture, increase government jobs for the middle classes, grant large wage increases to mollify
organized labor, etc.....Between 1970 and 1976, the number of federal government employees doubled and the growth rate of general government employment averaged 10.8 percent. A series of
large wage hikes after 1972 further inßated the government wage bill.”10
In what follows we thus take it for granted that the SOE’s are used to redistribute income.11
7

See Morales and Sachs (1989), p.180.
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See Morales and Sachs (1989), pp.192-193.

9

Ibid. p.197.

10

See Buﬃe (1989), p. 420.
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Here we do not deal with the question as to why they are used as a tool of redistribution when there are more
eﬃcient tools. One possible answer to this question is that the lack of transparency in generating redistribution
through nonmonetary transfers makes SOE’s a politically eﬃcient tool. See Coate and Morris (1995) for a formal
model that shows that politicians would prefer to redistribute via public works rather than cash transfers when
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The question that remains to be answered then is: Under what conditions are they an acceptable
means of income redistribution? In what follows we set up a formal model that yields an answer
to that question, namely, that as long as the median wealth is less than the average wealth the
majority of the population will prefer to establish an SOE sector to redistribute income. A corollary
to this theoretical Þnding is that the more unequal the distribution of wealth (as measured by the
diﬀerence between median and average wealth) the more extensive will be the SOE sector. In a
democratic setting with majority voting this implies, under certain conditions, that we can invoke
the median-voter theorem to suggest that an SOE sector would be established for redistributive
purposes.12 Otherwise, we surmise that the preferences of the majority would, through channels
we leave unspeciÞed, Þnd its expression in policies that favor redistribution through the SOE’s.
These channels may take the form of a desire on the part of dictators (as in the case of Banzer
in Bolivia) or autocrats (as in the case of Echeverria in Mexico) to Þnd popular support for their
rule.
We also empirically test the hypothesis formulated in the theoretical model. We employ three
measures of inequality to study its eﬀect on the size of the SOE sector. One measure of inequality
we use is the land gini. This is a measure that comes closest to the theoretical measure in that it is
a measure of wealth inequality. A second measure we use is the share of the median quintile of the
population in national income. This measure comes closest to representing the share of the median
voter in that interpretation of our formulation. The third measure is the more frequently used
measure of income inequality, namely the income gini. We measure the relative size of the SOE
sector in three diﬀerent ways as well: the share of the SOE’s in GDP, their share in nonagricultural
GDP, and their share in total employment. Across most measures we Þnd strong empirical support
in favor of our hypothesis that an increase in inequality is associated with a bigger SOE sector.
We also show that this conclusion is extremely robust with respect to the controls used.
voters lack information.
12

The median voter approach has been the target of empirical inquiry in a wide variety of contexts. For a recent
study that Þnds strong empirical support for the median voter approach to trade policy determination, see Dutt
and Mitra (2002a).
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In addition, we test whether democracies are more prone than dictatorships to redistribute
income through the use of the SOE sector. We Þnd no evidence that this is the case and conÞrm
the Alesina and Rodrik (1994) Þnding that when it comes to distributional issues even dictators
bow to popular will. We are also interested in probing the role of political ideology in our context
and test the hypothesis that left-wing governments redistribute more than the right-wing ones and
Þnd strong and robust support for it. Though both types of governments do use the SOE sector
as a redistributive tool, the tendency of the left-wing governments to do so is more pronounced.
This should come as no surprise since the constituencies of left-wing governments would favor such
redistribution more strongly than those of right-wing governments.13
It is also worth noting that our empirical Þndings are also consistent with the recent literature
that emphasizes the concept of common property and the attempt by diﬀerent groups in societies
to appropriate the common property.14

These models are said to apply to societies where there

is “extreme inequality”. If the resources of the SOE’s are viewed as common property by the
“various competing groups of the middle classes” as suggested in a quote above then our Þndings
should be interpreted as also giving empirical support to the common property notion and the
models built to elucidate it.
To sum up the contribution of our paper to the literature is twofold. First it sets up a
simple theoretical framework to establish formally the idea that SOE’s will be used to redistribute
income when inequality is suﬃciently pronounced. Secondly, the paper contributes to the empirical
literature on redistribution with and without democracy, on the role of political ideology and on
state owned enterprises.
In section 2, we set up the theoretical model. Section 3 describes the empirical testing, while
the last section provides some concluding remarks.
13 Dutt and Mitra (2002b) also Þnd strong empirical support for the hypothesis that left-wing governments tend
to redistribute more via trade policy than right-wing governments.
14

See Tornell and Velasco (1992) and Benhabib and Rustichini (1996) among others.
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2

Model

In this section we formulate the simplest possible model that conveys the proposition that the
SOE’s may be used as a redistributive mechanism. To do so consider an economy populated by L
households all endowed with a single unit of labor and varying amounts of capital. The economy
may potentially produce three goods in three diﬀerent sectors. For analytical simplicity, one could
either imagine the economy under consideration to be closed-in which case we will assume that the
goods are perfect substitutes in consumption with their relative price Þxed at unity-or that it is a
small open economy-in which case the parametrically given relative prices are again normalized to
unity with an appropriate choice of units. We now turn to a detailed discussion of the production
side of the model.

2.1

Production

The Þrst of the three sectors will be called the ”formal sector”. This sector functions as the
”modern”, industrialized sector in the model. It uses capital and labor to produce a consumption
good under a constant-returns-to-scale technology in a perfectly competitive market. The output
of this good is given by

Qp = F (K, Lp )

(1)

where the production function F (·, ·) possesses the usual neo-classical properties and K and Lp denote the capital (physical and/or human) and labor employed in the sector under consideration.15

The second sector is labeled the “informal sector”. Agents employed in this perfectly competitive sector have access to a Ricardian technology with a constant input-output coeﬃcient 1/α
and produce a consumption good using labor alone. The labelling of this sector is motivated by
15 Since the formal sector is the only sector that employs capital (as will be seen below) K also denotes the total
capital stock of the economy.
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the observation that in developing countries (as well as some ”developed” countries, such as Spain
or Southern Italy) agents who are not employed in either the ”modern” private sector or by the
SOE’s Þnd employment (or are considered oﬃcially unemployed) in an informal sector, of which
street peddling and Mariachi bands are the most picturesque examples.
Finally, the public sector may also employ labor, Lg , in SOE’s to produce the same consumption
good (or a perfectly substitutable good) with the same Ricardian technology that the informal
sector uses.16

The SOE’s may pay a wage, wg , higher than the marginal productivity of labor

employed. If this is the case, the losses, (wg − α)lg , (where lowercase letters denote per-capita
variables) of the SOE’s, are Þnanced by the revenues of a proportional income tax, τ, imposed on
the factors employed by the formal sector.17

The government budget constraint is, thus, given

by

(wg − α)lg = τ qp

(2)

where the right hand-side of (2) denotes the outlays of the government and the left hand-side its
tax revenue.
Now, competition from workers in the informal sector ensures that the after-tax wage rate
across these private sectors is equalized.18

Thus, given the proportional tax rate, proÞt maxi-

mization by Þrms in the formal sector implies that the rate of return on capital, r, and the level
of employment in this sector depend negatively on the tax rate:
16 In reality, of course, the SOE’s may have (and typically, many of them do have) access to technologies
potentially more capital-intensive than the ”modern” private sector. Three considerations motivate the modeling
choice made in the paper. First, as argued in the Introduction, we observe that SOE’s normally employ ”surplus
labor” that renders their technology labor-intensive. Second, the actual pricing of the capital input in the SOE’s
is such that the shadow rentals to be attributed to the capital they own is typically below market value. Finally,
the technology modeled in the paper brings out very sharply the potentially superßuous nature of the SOE’s from
a strictly economic (as opposed to political) point of view.
17 The informal sector is in practice very diﬃcult to tax, thus any revenue that governments actually raise by
taxing this sector is small enough to be safely ignored in the present model.
18

Though the formal sector (because of market imperfections) typically pays a wage above that which can be
earned in the informal sector, that wage is depressed by competition from the pool of workers that Þnd themselves
in the latter sector. The result here should, therefore, be interpreted as a version (at the margin) of the observed
outcome.
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lp = l(τ),

l0 (τ) < 0,

(3)

r = r(τ ),

r0 (τ ) < 0.

(4)

Intuitively, a higher tax rate lowers the employment level by reducing the after-tax marginal
productivity of labor in the formal sector. Decreased employment, in turn, diminishes the marginal
productivity of capital.19
2.1.1

Consumption

Turning to the consumption decisions of the households note that they supply labor and capital
in competitive markets. Each household is assumed to supply inelastically the unit of labor with
which it is endowed. However, households diﬀer with respect to their capital endowments ki ≥ 0
(i = 1, .., L).
Given the static nature of the model and the fact that there is, eﬀectively, one composite good
to be consumed, the consumption decisions of households are quite simple-each household, facing
the parametric tax rate and factor prices uses its wage and rental income (received in exchange
for the services of labor and capital supplied) to consume this composite good.
2.1.2

Political Economy

The environment within which we work is now endowed with suﬃcient structure to answer the
principal question we are interested in: Under what conditions will this economy choose to operate
a state owned enterprise described above?
To answer this question, however, we need to prescribe a rule which governs the political
decision process. The simplest and most frequently used rule in the literature is the majority rule
provided that decisions are made in a democracy, the agenda consists of a single item, and voters’
preferences are single peaked. If this is the case, it is the preferences of the median voter we need
19

For explicit expressions for the derivatives in these and following equations see Appendix II.
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to consult to see if s/he would choose to operate the SOE under question. Even in the absence of
democracy, the median voter’s preference yields, at the very least, some measure of the strength
of support for the SOE’s that the rulers will need to pay attention to.20
Now, since the consumer consumes all of his income in this static world, the determination of
the tax rate preferred by a household i can be formulated as the solution to the maximization
problem faced by this household of (expected) indirect utility

U = lg u[(l − τ )rki + wg ] + (1 − lg )u[(l − τ )rki + α]

(5)

(where lg , the ratio of employment in the SOE to total employment, also denotes, from the
household’s point of view, the probability of being employed by the SOE and, thus receiving wg ;
the household will otherwise be employed by the (formal or informal) private sector and earn the
wage α) subject to the government budget constraint (2) with

(wg − α)lg = τqp ,

τqp ≥ 0

(6)

The Þrst-order conditions for the problem are

β−τ k
lg u0 (cg ) + (1 − lg )u0 (cp )
=
u0 (cg ) + σ
β(1 − τ ) ki

(7)

u(cg ) − u(cp ) = u0 (cg )(wg − α)

(8)

στqp = 0

(9)

where σ is the multiplier associated with the inequality constraint and β denotes the income share
of capital in the formal sector.
Proposition 1 Agent i preferes no taxation (τ = 0) and, thus, no state state owned enterprises
if and only if his capital endowment ki exceeds the average capital endowment k.
20

It is well understood that even dictators need some minimal popular support for their survival.
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Proof. The proof proceeds in two steps. The Þrst step shows that τ = 0 implies ki > k. The
second step shows the reverse implication.
1. Suppose τ = 0. This implies cg = cp = c, lg = 0, and σ > 0. The Þrst order condition then
becomes u0 (c)/[u0 (c) + σ] = k/ki . Since the lefthand-side of this equation is less than 1, we have
k < ki .
2. Suppose k < ki . We will show that if τ > 0 this would violate of the Þrst-order condition.
If τ > 0 then σ = 0. Then the lefthand-side of the equation in the Þrst-order condition becomes
[lg u0 (cg ) + (1 − lg )u0 (cp )]/[u0 (cg )]. It is straightforward to show that this expression is greater than
1, because in this case cg > cp and u00 (·) < 0. However, with k < ki and β < 1 the expression
on the righthand-side of the Þrst-order condition is less than 1. Thus, the Þrst-order condition is
violated.
Proposition 2 Ceteris paribus agent i beneÞts more from a higher tax and, thus, a larger stateowned enterprise sector the smaller is his capital endowment ki relative to the average capital
endowment k.
Proof. It is straightforward to obtain the following

(β − τ )
ki
dUi
u0 (cg )
> 0 ⇐⇒
>
dτ
β(1 − τ ) lg u0 (cg ) + (1 − lg )u0 (cp )
k

(10)

The smaller is ki relative to the average capital endowment k the more likely it is for this inequality
to hold. Note that for ki = 0 this inequality implies a welfare-maximizing level of tax τ̃ such that
τ̃ = β. this is the tax rate that maximizes the tax revenue of the government allowing for the
maximum size of the state-owned enterprise sector.

This proposition can be taken to imply that the lower is the median agent’s capital endowment
relative to that of the average agent, the bigger will be the size of the SOE sector.21

To see

why start with some tax rate. Will the median agent have a higher utility if the tax rate is
raised? Or, to put it diﬀerently, would the median agent prefer a higher tax rate? The answer
21

The median agent is deÞned here to mean the agent that owns the median capital stock.
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is more likely to be in the aﬃrmative the smaller is the median agent’s endowment relative to
the endowment of the average agent. Intuitively speaking, this result belongs to a class of results
obtained in the political economy literature that redistributive instruments will be preferred by
a median voter whose wealth (or income) lies below that of the average agent. It diﬀers from
the existing literature in the form of the redistributive instrument (which is generally a lump-sum
transfer payment22 ). But our result can also be interpreted to imply simply that (i) the majority
of the population would prefer to have an SOE sector as long as the the median agent’s capital
endowment is smaller than that of the average agent, and (ii) this majority would be a larger
fraction of the population the lower is median agent’s capital endowment relative to that of the
average agent. Under such an interpretation we would leave the nexus between the preferences of
the majority and the ultimate political decision unspeciÞed, and yet point out to the needs of even
autocrats and dictators for popular support to perpetuate their rule. This need seems to have
motivated rulers like Banzer of Bolivia and Echeverria of Mexico to use the SOE’s to redistribute
income to obtain the support required.

3

Econometric SpeciÞcation and Methodology

The theory outlined above predicts that the more unequal the distribution of wealth is, the more
likely it is for a country to operate a SOE sector as a redistributive tool. To test this prediction
we use cross-country regressions of the following type
RSOEi = α1 + α2 IN EQi + α3 P CAPi + εi

(11)

where RSOE is an indicator of the relative size of the SOE’s in economic activity, INEQ denotes
a measure of wealth inequality and P CAP is the per-capita 1960 income of country i. This last
variable is included in the equation as a control variable to check whether the initial level of development of an economy aﬀects the use of SOE’s as a redistributive instrument. Our expectation
22

See, for example, Persson and Tabellini (1992) and Alesina and Rodrik (1992).
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is that rich countries would tend to use the SOE’s less as a tool for redistribution since they may
have access to more eﬃcient means of redistributing income. Thus, we expect the sign of the
coeﬃcient for per capita income to be negative.
It is possible to construct several indicators that measure the relative size of the SOE sector in
overall economic activity in our sample. The share of the SOE’s in GDP (denoted by
share in nonagricultural GDP (denoted by
by

SOE_EMP
EMP

SOE
NONAG )

SOE
GDP ),

their

and their share in total employment (denoted

) are three potential measures. We use the average of the period 1978-1991 for these

variables.
In our main regressions we use both asset (wealth) distribution and income distribution variables on the right-hand side. Land gini in particular is used as the indicator of the wealth
inequality. We expect a positive sign for its coeﬃcient, that is, as the wealth distribution becomes
more unequal (represented by an increase in land gini), we expect the share of SOE’s in total
GDP to increase. To check the robustness of our results, we also use indices of income inequality,
namely the share of third quintile in income distribution (henceforth referred to as QU IN) and
the income gini coeﬃcient (denoted by GINI). It should be clear that for our purposes the share
of third quintile is a better indicator of income inequality than the income gini, because the former
is closer to the share of median voter, whereas the latter is a broader interpretation of income
inequality. In those regressions where we use the share of the third quintile in income distribution
we expect its coeﬃcient to have a negative sign because this is a measure of reverse inequality.
Finally, we of course expect the sign of the coeﬃcient of the income gini variable to be positive.
The theory does not suggest any reverse causation running from the relative size of the SOE’s
in the economy to wealth distribution, since the wealth distribution is exogenous to the model.
However, the size of the SOE sector may aﬀect income inequality. SpeciÞcally, in countries where
income inequality is more pronounced we expect the SOE’s to be used to redistribute income,
thereby reducing income inequality. Hence, both the QUIN and the GIN I variables may be
endogenous. It is also possible that the P CAP variable may suﬀer from the endogeneity problem
12

to the extent that the availability of other politically acceptable means of redistribution that are
more eﬃcient for this purpose than the SOE’s may itself lead to higher per-capita income. One can
argue that the regression of SOE-related variables of the period 1978-1991 on per-capita incomes
in 1960, i.e., a time lag between dependent and independent variables, may rule out the problem.
However, if the variables exhibit stickiness, the problem may persist.
In view of these potential problems, we use weighted two-stages least squares (W2SLS) to
address the heteroscedasticity and endogeneity problems. Furthermore, to check the endogeneity
of the variables in question we use the test suggested by Hausman (1978), which involves comparing
the estimates from the OLS and an instrumental variable (IV) method to see whether these are
signiÞcantly diﬀerent from each other. As for heteroscedasticity, we Þrst do a visual inspection: we
plot the residuals from preliminary (unweighted) OLS regressions against the per capita income
variable, and check whether the dispersion of residual variances diﬀer along per capita income,
that is, if they are clustered into groups. The presence of this would suggest the existence of
the heteroscedasticity problem. Formally, we test the heteroscedasticity by modeling the error
variance as a function of the size of the economies. The details of these tests are given in the
section 5.
As for the instruments, a small number of exogenous variables is suﬃcient to get sensible results.
Our list includes the following variables: the land gini, an indicator of democracy, dummies for
lower-middle and upper-middle income countries. All of these instruments are used consistently
across our regressions.23

In addition to this, we need to use an exogenous weight to take care

of the heteroscedasticity problem. We choose Nehru-Dhareswar capital-labor ratio (henceforth
referred to as ND) for this purpose since it can approximate the size of the economy.24 ,25
23 Since the number of variables in our instruments matrix is greater than the number of independent variables,
our equations are over-identiÞed. We also perform the corresponding over-identiÞcation test, and the null hypothesis
is accepted in every case.
24 As the variable that is causing the heteroskedasticity problem, P CAP suggests itself as a weight. However,
since we are using the two-stages least squares method to take care of the endogeneity problem, we cannot use this
endogenous variable as the weight, which, otherwise, will be correlated with the error term.
25

The correlation between per capita income and ND capital-labor data in our sample is 0.77. We prefer to
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4

Data

In this section we provide a brief summary of the data and their sources. Our dependent variables
that measure the relative size of SOE’s in each country are the share of the SOE sector as percentage share of (1) GDP, (2) nonagricultural GDP and (3) total employment. This data comes
from Bureaucrats in Business: The Economics and Politics of Government Ownership, ( a World
Bank Policy Research Report).
We obtain the data on land gini and income gini from Deininger and Squire (1996).26

The

data on the share of third quintile in income distribution averaged for 1980’s were obtained from
World Development Indicators (1999). Nehru-Dhareshwar capital-labor ratio data are from Nehru
and Dhareshwar (1993).27
The data on democracy comes from the Easterly-Levine dataset. The scores on democracy
in this dataset are very close to the political rights index of Gastil, but the country coverage
of Easterly-Levine dataset is broader. We used the democracy scores for the year 1989. The
Easterly-Levine index is such that more democratic countries are assigned a lower score than less
democratic countries (the scores run from 1 to 7). We reversed the scores by substracting each
score from 8 so that more democratic countries are assigned higher scores.
The data on per capita income and the dummies for lower-middle and upper-middle income
countries are obtained from Social Indicators and Fixed Factors dataset of the World Bank. The
per capita income variable is scaled by 1/1000.
proceed with ND dataset since its country coverage is broader than the other capital-labor ratio data sets on in the
literature: that of Summers-Heston (SH) and that of Easterly-Levine (EL). We also exercise with these datasets.
While our results do not change qualitatively when we use them, the coeﬃcients become marginally insigniÞcant
due to the loss of observations.
26 SpeciÞcally, we use the adjusted version of Deininger and Squire dataset by Dutt and Mitra (2002a). They add
6.6 points to the income gini values to adjust for the diﬀerences between income-based data and expenditure-based
coeﬃcients.
27 The Þgures are in 1987 local prices. We Þrst convert them into US dollars with 1987 exchange rate of each
country, and then divide them by the number of population between the ages 15 and 64, the data of which were
obtained again from Nehru and Dhareshwar (1993). Afterwards, for comparability with the Summers-Heston and
Easterly-Levine capital-labor ratio data, which are in 1985 dollars, we adjusted the data to the 1985 prices by
applying the formula (K/L) ∗ P 85/P 87 where P 85 and P 87 are the GDP deßators of each country taken from
World Development Indicators (1999). In proceeding, we deleted Mexico and Uruguay from the data set as they
had extraordinarily high Þgures.
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5

Results

In Table 1 we provide the estimation results when we use the land gini as a measure of wealth
distribution.28 When we use

SOE
GDP

and

SOE
NONAG

as our measures of the relative size of the SOE

sector, our estimates for coeﬃcients of the land gini are signiÞcant at 1% level with correct positive
signs.29

The coeﬃcients are 0.0013 and 0.0017, respectively (to interpret these coeﬃcients, it

should be kept in mind that both land gini and our measures of the relative SOE size are in
percentages, implying, for instance, that a 1% increase in wealth inequality leads to a 0.13%
increase in the size of the SOE sector relative to GDP). For these regressions, P CAP is negative
and signiÞcant. The number of observations included in the regressions is around 42-43. The
models are signiÞcant at 1% and 5% level, respectively, as shown by the F-statistic.30
regression with dependent variable

SOE_EMP
EMP

For the

, we fail to obtain signiÞcant estimates, possibly due

to a very small number (25 to be precise) of countries.
Table 2 presents the estimation results when we use the share of the third quintile QUIN
as an indicator of the inequality of income distribution. With the dependent variables
and

SOE
NONAG ,

SOE
GDP

the coeﬃcients of this variable are negative and signiÞcant. These coeﬃcients are

-0.0218 (signiÞcant at 5%) and -0.0266 (signiÞcant at 5%), respectively. These results suggest that
in countries where the share of the median quintile in income distribution is higher (more equal
distribution), SOE sector is not used as extensively to redistribute income. In these regressions,
the coeﬃcient of the P CAP variable is not signiÞcant while its sign is negative for
positive for

SOE
NONAG .

SOE
GDP

, and

The number of observations are around 35-36. F-statistics show that both

models are signiÞcant at 5%. As for the dependent variable SOE_EMP, the coeﬃcient of QUIN
28

The equation numbers that appear in the tables refer to equations listed in appendix 1.

29 The estimation methodolgies indicated in the tables reßect the fact that if our tests indicated heteroscedasticity
and endogeneity we run W2SLS, if the tests indicated only heteroscedasticity we run WLS, otherwise we run OLS.
30 R 2 s are purely descriptive in the generalized regression context and does not indicate the Þt. The models
become diﬀerent once they are transformed (weighted). In other words, the dependent variable in the transformed
regression y∗ = X∗ β + ε∗ is diﬀerent than the one in untransformed (original) regression, y = Xβ + ε. For
example, in our case, the new dependent variable is y∗ = y/ (K/L).
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is insigniÞcant. However, that of P CAP is negative and signiÞcant at 5%. This would imply that
in countries where initial per capita income is higher, the shares of SOE’s in employment is lower.
This version of the model is signiÞcant overall at 10% level, with, again, a low number (25) of
observations.
Table 2 further provides the estimation results when we use the income gini (GIN I) as a
measure of income distribution. The coeﬃcient of this variable is also signiÞcant and displays
the predicted (positive) sign. For the dependent variables

SOE
GDP

and

SOE
NONAG ,

the coeﬃcients of

GIN I are positive and signiÞcant at 1% level, 0.0084 and 0.0112, respectively. This suggests that
the more unequal the income distribution in a country is, the more pronounced is the role of the
SOE’s as redistributive instruments. The P CAP variable is negative and signiÞcant at 1% level
for both of the models. With the number of observations around 36-37, the models are overall
signiÞcant at 1%. We also have the SOE_EM P variable with a signiÞcant estimate for GIN I.
The estimate is 0.0047 and signiÞcant at 10%. The intuition is that as wealth becomes more
evenly (unevenly) distributed, the share of SOEs in employment diminishes (increases).

5.1
5.1.1

Checking for Robustness
Hausman Tests

As mentioned above, we suspect that the variables QU IN, GINI and P CAP may be endogenous.
For this reason we carried out the Hausman Test to check whether the regressors are correlated
with the error term. The classical linear model assumes E(Xε) = 0, that is independence of the
vector of regressors, X, from the vector of disturbances, ε. Violation of this assumption leads to
biased and inconsistent OLS estimates. The results for the Hausmann tests we ran are given in
Table 3.
For each of the suspected variables, we run auxiliary regressions in which we used land gini,
the democracy score, dummies for lower-middle and upper-middle income countries as right-hand
side variables. In each of these reduced form equations, we observed great signiÞcance levels for
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the exogenous variables.
After saving the residuals from each auxiliary regression, we inserted them into the corresponding original regressions, and looked at their signiÞcance levels. The Hausman test predicts that if
the coeﬃcients of these residuals in the original regressions are signiÞcant, then the OLS estimates
are inconsistent, and the use of an instrumental variable method is in order. However, if they are
insigniÞcant, OLS estimates are consistent and identical to IV estimates.
The series of tests for the suspected variables show that the P CAP variable is endogenous
when the dependent variables are

SOE
GDP

and

SOE
NONAG

while the measure of wealth inequality is

the land gini. Therefore, the use of the IV method is appropriate. For the equation in which the
dependent variable is

SOE_EMP
EMP

, the Hausman test provides no evidence for endogeneity.31

Similarly, when the dependent variables are

SOE
GDP

and

SOE
NONAG

while the measure of inequality

is QUIN , the P CAP and QU IN variables are jointly endogenous to the models in question.32
The OLS estimates would have been inconsistent had we employed that method. When we use
SOE_EMP
EMP

as the dependent variable in this case, the variables P CAP and QU IN do not suﬀer

from endogeneity jointly.
When GIN I is used as the measure of income distribution, the Hausman test does not provide
any evidence for the joint signiÞcance of the auxiliary P CAP and GIN I variables. Hence, OLS
would provide consistent estimates.
5.1.2

Modeling Heteroscedasticity

As mentioned above, the P CAP variable may create a heteroscedasticity problem due to clustering
of developing and developed countries. Failure to correct this problem will lead to the violation
of one of the assumptions of the classical linear model; that is, E(εε0 ) 6= σ2 I any more, meaning
31 For those regressions in which we cannot detect these problems, we report, without loss of generality, the
results of OLS in our appendix.
32 In this sort of multivariate Hausman test, it is the joint signiÞcance of the variables that matters for their
endogeneity, rather than their individual signiÞcance. Therefore, we test if these Þrst-step residuals in the original
regressions are jointly signiÞcant to check their endogeneity. The results are given in the bottom part of Table 3.2
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that individual disturbance terms do not have uniform variance with the consequence that our
estimates would be ineﬃcient.
The Þrst step in the investigation of this problem is the plotting of the residuals from a set of
preliminary regressions against per capita income with which we suspect the disturbance variance
is related. In seven of the nine regressions, we see a clustering of the developing and developed
countries in the scatter plots, with low level of P CAP having high variances and vice versa. This
suggests that the size of the economy matters in explaining the share of the SOE’s in the economy.
In addition, we model the log of our error variance as a function of the log of capital-labor
ratio, an exogenous variable that indicates the size of the economy.33 ,34 The choice of functional
form is such that we Þrst try diﬀerent variance speciÞcations to see what the error variances in the
regressions are proportional to, and these trials indicate that they are proportional to the square
of the capital-labor ratio. Formally, we Þnd that, in a model yi = x0i β + εi with assumptions
i = 1, 2, .., n, E[εi ] = 0, the variance speciÞcation E[ε2i ] = σ 2i = σ 2 ki2 is the most signiÞcant
(where ki denotes the K/L ratio). Whether there is heteroscedasticity or not is empirically
answerable by looking at the estimate of θ, i.e., if it is signiÞcantly diﬀerent from zero in the
model ln(ε̂2i ) = δ + θ ln(ki2 ) + vi .
Estimating this model in our context is as follows: after running an unweighted regression for
each equation, we saved the corresponding residuals. Then we regressed the log of these squared
θ < 0 and
residuals on a constant and on the log of the squared capital-labor ratio. A Þnding of b

signiÞcant would conÞrm our hypothesis that the error variance is higher for the Þrst group of
countries than for the second group, bearing out the clustering conjecture. In fact, for eight of the
33 Most heteroscedasticity tests such as Goldfeld-Quandt (1965) and White (1980) are quite general in that they
do not take into account the relationship between the error variance and the variables suspected to determine that
variance. As we are aware of the source of the problem (clustering of per capita income variable of developed and
developing countries), we preferred to model our error variance. Additionally, Green (1997) states that tests based
on modeling heteroscedasticity are likely to be more powerful than an omnibus test such as White’s in the speciÞc
context of its regression model.
34 Like any variable in economics, the endogeneity of the capital-labor ratio can be argued, but both capital and
labor are taken Þxed in our theoretical model.
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nine regressions, we Þnd a negative relationship between the residuals and the capital-labor ratio,
showing that the higher the capital-labor ratio is (the more developed a country is), the lower is
the residual (the lower is the variance). For the equations (R1), (R2) and (R8), these relationships
were signiÞcant at around 5% level, for the equation (R9) at 10%, and for (R4), (R5) and (R7)
at some higher levels. Therefore, for these regressions the heteroscedasticity problem is formally
diagnosed. The details of the results are provided in Table 4.
Having determined the existence of the heteroscedasticity problem, next we take steps to
correct it. For this purpose, we weight the regressions with the Nehru-Dheshwar capital-labor
ratio to account for the size of the economies. All the variables in the model, including the
instruments where appropriate, are multiplied by the reciprocal of the capital-labor ratio, rendering
the variances uniform. In other words, the diagnosis of the problem allows us to form our Þnal
transformed regression model in the following way:

yi
x0 β εi
= i +
ki
ki
ki

(12)

The correction of this problem improves the signiÞcance level of the (unweighted) regressions,
having improved their eﬃciency. We retain the OLS for those regressions for which we could not
conÞrm the problem formally.
5.1.3

Using P CAP as Weight

For the regressions in which P CAP does not exhibit an endogeneity, as shown by the tests,
it is legitimate to check the relevant equations by using this variable as the weight. We can
apply this robustness check to the equations (R3), (R6)-(R9). For the equations (R3), (R6) and
(R9), heteroscedastic error model with P CAP variable (instead of K/L) shows the existence of
heteroscedasticity weakly. The application of the test to the equations (R7) and (R8) supports
the existence of the problem at 10% and 1%, respectively. Running the original regressions with
P CAP as the weight does not make any diﬀerence in the coeﬃcients. Hence, the use of ND
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capital-labor ratio proves to be a good option.
5.1.4

Ramsey’s RESET Test

In order to check for the existence of non-linearity, we employ Ramsey’s RESET test. The test
results show that the equations (R1) - (R6) and (R9) do not have any speciÞcation error, while
the equations (R7) and (R8) may necessiate a change of the functional form. Converting these
models into reciprocal models (reciprocal in P CAP only) removes the speciÞcation error problem.
Additionally, the results do not change qualitatively, i.e., signs of GIN I remain exactly as before.35
This may imply some non-linearity in these models in that as the per capita income in a country
increases, the share of SOEs in GDP and in nonagricultural GDP decrases at a decreasing rate.
5.1.5

Dictatorship vs Democracy

In the introduction we have argued that policymakers tend to be responsive to the concerns of the
majority of the population whether they are democratically elected or not. One could however
plausibly counter that there certainly might be a signiÞcant diﬀerence in degree if not in kind
between dictatorial and democratic policymakers. To investigate this claim in the context of the
SOE sector as a means of redistribution, we ran a series of tests. First, we ran our regressions
including our democracy variable and the interaction of this variable with our inequality variables.
Second, we used a dummy variable for democracy (trying diﬀerent threshold values to separate
countries into democratic and dictatorial ones) and the interaction of this dummy variable with
measures of inequality. Third, we generated residuals from our main regressions and regressed
the absolute values of these residuals on our democracy variable. None of these tests yielded any
statistically signiÞcant results, strongly suggesting that (as far as redistribution through the SOE
sector is concerned) dictatorships are as responsive to majoritarian concerns as democracies: a
conclusion in conformity with the anecdotal/historical evidence a limited selection of which we
35

The results of Ramsey’s RESET test are available upon request.
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cited in our introduction.36
5.1.6

The Role of Political Ideology

The role of political ideology or partisan politics in the choice of policy instruments and on macroeconomic outcomes is an important issue and has been explored both theoretically and empirically.37
Here we investigate empirically the related question as to whether left-wing governments would be
more likely to redistribute (using SOE’s as their redistributive tool) than right-wing governments.
The investigation is motivated by the observation that the constituency of left-wing parties consist
of (appropriating the terminology of Hibbs (1987)) “down-scale classes” whereas the constituency
of the right-wing parties consist of “up-scale” groups who tend to be richer. Though we would
expect governments composed of either type of political party to redistribute, left-wing governments would be expected to be more responsive to the demands of their core constituency and to
redistribute more than their right-wing counterparts. To test this hypothesis we ran regressions
of the type
µ

SOE
GDP

¶

= ξ 1 + ξ 2 IN EQi + ξ 3 P CAPi + ξ 4 W INGi + ξ 5 (W IN G)(IN EQ) + εi

i

where IN EQ is a measure of inequality and W IN G is a variable indicating whether the government in question left-wing, center, or right-wing, taking respectively the values 1, 2, or 3.38

For

the IN EQ variable we used the land gini, as well as the GINI and QU IN variables employed
above. Our results are not statistically signiÞcant in the case of land gini. However, when we use
GIN I or QU IN as our measure of inequality our results are both signiÞcant and the coeﬃcients
have the signs we expect them to have a priori.
36 Alesina and Rodrik (1994) also conclude that “..even in a dictatorship, distributional issues aﬀecting the
majority of the population will inßuence policy outcomes.” More recently, Dutt and Mitra (2002a) reach a similar
conclusion in their empirical investigation of the political economy of trade policy.
37 The basic models here are that of Hibbs (1977, 1987, 1994) and of Alesina (1987). For an extensive discussion
of the issues involved, see Drazen (2000). Outside the macroeconomic literature there has not been much work
done. For an exception, see Dutt and Mitra (2002b) who discuss the eﬀects of political ideology on trade policy.
38 The data we have on the political ideology of governments is qualitative. We converted this data to the following
numerical codes: left-wing governments are assigned number 1, center governments number 2, and right-wing
governments number 3. The data covers the years 1978 to 1991. Most countries in our data set had governments
with that were either right- or left-wing for the entire period. In the case of those countries which had governments
of diﬀerent ideologies for diﬀerent arts of the period covered we assigned the ideology that was dominant.
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In the case where we measure inequality using GIN I we have
∂SHSOE
∂W ING

= 0.33 − 0.01(GINI),

∂SHSOE
∂GINI∂W ING

∂SHSOE
∂GINI

= 0.03 − 0.01(W ING),

= −0.01. A priori, we expect

∂SHSOE
∂GINI

> 0 since

as GIN I and, thus, inequality increases, our theory predicts that the share of SOE’s in GDP
should rise. Given our numerical codiÞcation of the political ideology of governments, regression
results above conÞrm this most importantly for left-wing and center governments. Further, we
expect

∂SHSOE
∂W ING

< 0 because as W ING rises, governments become more right-wing which we

don’t expect to redistribute as much leading to a decline in the share of SOE’s. Our regression
results above support this conclusion. Finally, we expect the left-wing governments to reinforce
the tendency to redistribute when inequality is high. That is we expect

∂SHSOE
∂GINI∂W ING

= ξ 5 < 0.

As the results above show this expectation is also borne out by our regressions.
When we use QUIN as our mesaure of inequality we obtain
∂SHSOE
∂W ING

= −0.43+0.02(QU IN ),

∂SHSOE
∂QUIN∂W ING

∂SHSOE
∂QUIN

= −0.08 + 0.02(W ING),

= 0.02. A priori, we expect

∂SHSOE
∂QUIN

< 0 since as

QUIN falls, this being an inverse measure of inequality, inequality rises, our theory predicts that
the share of SOE’s in GDP should rise. Given our numerical codiÞcation of the political ideology
of governments, regression results above conÞrm this for all types of governments. Further, we
expect

∂SHSOE
∂W ING

< 0 because as W ING rises, governments become more right-wing which we

don’t expect to redistribute as much leading to a decline in the share of SOE’s. Our regression
results support this conclusion as well. Finally, we expect the left-wing governments to reinforce
the tendency to redistribute when inequality is high. That is we expect

∂SHSOE
∂QU IN∂W ING

= ξ 5 > 0.

Our results once again bear out this expectation.

6

Conclusion

The paper formalizes a popular, but informal, argument to explain the persistence of the SOE
sector in many less developed countries (as well as transitional countries like Russia). In its
broadest outlines the argument is that the SOE sector is used as a redistributive device and
cannot be easily given up especially given the pains of other reforms that form a package of
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structural adjustment. It is shown that as long as the wealth of the median voter is less than that
of the average agent, the former prefers to establish or maintain an SOE sector that pays higher
wages than the private sector and carries surplus labor. The paper then Þnds strong and robust
empirical support for this hypothesis.
In addition, we use our setup to test two questions that generally come up in the political
economy literature when median voter is invoked: whether (i) democracies are more likely to
be responsive to popular pressures when it comes to redistribution, and (ii) whether and to what
extent the political ideology of governing parties aﬀects redistribution. We Þnd Þrst that we cannot
Þnd any support for the hypothesis that democracies would be more likely to redistribute through
SOE’s than dictatorships. Second, we do Þnd strong and robust support for the hypothesis that
left-wing governments are more prone to use the SOE’ sector as a redistributive device.
The next natural question to ask, given the result obtained, is how to explain the successful
privatization experiments such as Argentina’s. To answer the question one can point out that
some factors that are not taken into account in the present model drive the process of privatization. For example, Waterbury argues that this process is driven by Þscal crises of varying intensity
coupled with inßation, reduced international credit-worthiness, and impediments to export promotion. Since, to keep the model as analytically simple as possible, we have abstracted from such
considerations, the model will not help us explore these factors.
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6.1

Appendix I
µ
µ
µ

SOE
GDP

¶

= α1 + α2 LAN Di + α3 P CAPi + εi

SOE
N ON AG

¶

µ
µ

SOE
GDP

¶

¶

µ

= γ 1 + γ 2 LAN Di + γ 3 P CAPi + ²i

(R3)

i

= δ 1 + δ 2 QU INi + δ 3 P CAPi + ωi

¶

(R4)

= φ1 + φ2 QU IN + φ3 P CAPi + ν i

(R5)

i

SOE_EM P
EM P

SOE
GDP

(R2)

i

SOE
NON AG

µ

µ

= β 1 + β 2 LAN Di + β 3 P CAPi + ξ i

i

SOE_EM P
EM P

µ

(R1)

i

¶

¶

= η1 + η2 QU IN + η3 P CAPi + ui

(R6)

i

= θ1 + θ2 GIN Ii + θ 3 P CAPi + ζ i

(R7)

i

SOE
NON AG

¶

SOE_EMP
EMP

= λ1 + λ2 GIN Ii + λ3 P CAPi + ς

(R8)

i

¶

= µ1 + µ2 GIN I + µ3 P CAPi + τ i

i
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(R9)

Table 1. Estimation Results for Wealth Distribution, Equations (R1) to (R3)
R1

R2

R3

SOE
GDP

SOE
NONAG

SOE_EMP
EMP

0.0387

0.0204

0.1470

0.0455)

(0.0587)

(0.0601)

0.0013∗∗

0.0017∗∗

-0.0006

(0.0006)

(0.0008)

(0.0010)

-0.0122∗∗∗

-0.0126∗∗∗

-0.0171

(0.0038)

(0.0049)

(0.0129)

Est.M ethodology

W2SLS

W2SLS

OLS

N

43

42

25

F − statistic

6.09∗∗∗

4.46∗∗

1.69

Constant

LAND

P CAP

Table 2. Estimation Results for Income Distribution, Equations (R4) to (R9)

Constant

QU IN

R4

R5

R6

R7

R8

R9

SOE
GDP

SOE
NONAG

SOE_EMP
EMP

SOE
GDP

SOE
NONAG

SOE_EMP
EMP

0.4343∗∗∗

0.5082∗∗∗

0.2507

-0.0870

-0.1924∗∗

-0.1329

(0.1568)

(0.1622)

(0.2355)

(0.0910)

(0.0958)

(0.1145)

-0.0218∗∗

-0.0266∗∗

0.0009

(0.0105)

(0.0108)

(0.0150)
0.0084∗∗∗

0.0112∗∗∗

0.0047∗

(0.0024)

(0.0026)

(0.0025)

GINI

-0.0006

0.0023

-0.1046∗∗

-0.0210∗∗∗

-0.0171∗∗∗

-0.0005

(0.0087)

(0.0090)

(0.0479)

(0.0054)

(0.0057)

(0.0045)

Est.M eth.

W2SLS

W2SLS

OLS

WLS

WLS

WLS

N

36

35

25

37

36

17

F − stat.

3.31∗∗

3.97∗∗

2.86∗

14.12∗∗∗

14.560∗∗∗

2.27

P CAP

27

N o te : 1 . S ta n d a rd erro rs in p a ra nth eses. * * * d en o tes th e sig n iÞ c a n ce level a t 1 % , * * a t 5 % , a n d * a t 1 0 % .

Table 3.1: Hausman Tests, Equations (R1) to (R3)
R1

R2

R3

SOE
GDP

SOE
NONAG

SOE_EMP
EMP

0.1779∗∗∗

0.2636∗∗∗

0.1487∗∗

(0.0612)

(0.0823)

(0.0615)

-4.27E-05

-0.0004

-0.0006

(0.0009)

(0.0012)

(0.0010)

-0.0243∗∗∗

-0.0383∗∗∗

-0.0197

(0.0094)

(0.0127)

(0.0151)

0.0230∗

0.0353∗∗

0.0051

(0.0129)

(0.0174)

(0.0143)

R2

0.1348

0.1864

0.1387

N

50

49

25

F − stat.

2.39∗

3.44∗∗

1.13

Constant

LAND

P CAP

RES_P CAP

N o t e : 1 . S t a n d a rd e rr o rs in p a r a n t h e s e s . * * * d e n o t e s t h e sig n iÞ c a n c e le v e l a t 1 % , * * a t 5 % , a n d * a t 1 0 % .

2.

RES_P CAP

is t h e c o e ﬃ c ie n t o f t h e re s id u a ls o f t h e p e r c a p it a in c o m e fr o m t h e a u x ilia ry re g re ss io n in w h ich t h e

P CAP

is r e g r e s s e d o n e x o g e n o u s va r ia b le s s u ch a s la n d g in i, t h e in d ic a t o r o f d e m o c ra c y a n d t h e d u m m ie s o f low e r -m id d le a n d u p p e r -m id d le in c o m e

co u ntries.
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Table 3.2. Hausman Tests, Equations (R4) to (R9)

Constant

QUIN

R4

R5

R6

R7

R8

R9

SOE
GDP

SOE
NONAG

SOE_EMP
EMP

SOE
GDP

SOE
NONAG

SOE_EMP
EMP

0.2949∗∗

0.3166∗∗

0.0695

-0.0341

0.0201

0.2630

(0.1118)

(0.1461)

(0.2778)

(0.1040)

(0.1203)

(0.1768)

-0.0107

-0.0080

0.0061

(0.0083)

(0.0110)

(0.0183)
0.0031

0.0026

-0.0038

(0.0021)

(0.0024)

(0.0038)

GINI

P CAP

RES_QUIN

-0.0134

-0.0265∗∗

-0.0485

-0.0005

-0.0065

-0.0131

(0.0096)

(0.0126)

(0.0349)

(0.0099)

(0.0114)

(0.0153)

0.0236∗∗

0.0213

-0.0067

(0.0107)

(0.0140)

(0.0183)
-0.0029

-0.0017

0.0069

(0.0032)

(0.0037)

(0.0056)

RES_GINI

RES_P CAP

0.0131

0.0237

0.0070

-0.0018

0.0030

0.0307

(0.0125)

(0.0164)

(0.0203)

(0.0127)

(0.0147)

(0.0190)

R2

0.2198

0.2267

0.2393

0.1080

0.1105

0.2315

N

41

40

20

33

32

15

F − stat.

2.54∗

2.57∗∗

1.18

0.85

0.84

0.75

F − Hausman

3.83∗∗

3.01∗

0.08

0.42

0.17

1.44

N o t e : 1 . S t a n d a rd e rr o rs in p a r a n t h e s e s . * * * d e n o t e s t h e sig n iÞ c a n c e le v e l a t 1 % , * * a t 5 % , a n d * a t 1 0 % .

2.

RES_QU IN

and

RES_GIN I a r e

GINI f r o m

t h e a u x ilia r y re g re s-

QU IN a n d P CAP , a n d GIN I a n d P CAP .

It is t h e sig n iÞ c a n c e

th e co eﬃ cients o f th e resid u a ls o f

QUIN

and

s io n s .

3 . F - H a u s m a n s h o w s t h e jo in t s ig n iÞ c a n c e o f t h e re s id u a ls o f

o f t h e s e t e s t s t h a t l e a d s t o t h e c o n c l u s i o n o f e n d o g e n e i t y.

29

Table 4. Modeling Heteroscedasticity, Eqs. (R1) to (R9)
log(εbi 2 )from
Eq.(R1)

(R2)

(R3)

(R4)

(R5)

(R6)

(R7)

(R8)

(R9)

b
δ

b
θ

-1.8983

-0.2391∗∗

(1.9536)

(0.2287)

-1.0955

-0.2600∗∗

(2.0953)

(0.1222)

-5.9178

-0.0141

(2.9404)

(0.1872)

-3.4140

2.1800§

(-0.1487)

(0.1283)

-2.1340

-0.2341§

(3.0324)

(0.1778)

-6.4102

0.0333

(4.2451)

(0.2762)

-2.5914

-0.2530

(3.0746)

(0.2385)

0.2633

-0.4028∗∗

(3.3293)

(0.1873)

2.4766

-0.5474∗

(4.9640)

(0.2998)

N

§§

43

42

21

36

35

20

29

28

17

N o t e : 1 . S t a n d a r d e r r o r s i n p a r a n t h e s e s . * * * d e n o t e s s i g n i Þ c a n c e l e v e l a t 1 % , * * a t 5 % , a n d * a t 1 0 % . Fo r e q u a t i o n s R 4 , R 5 a n d R 7 , § §

d e n o t e s s ig n iÞ c a n c e le v e l a t 1 5 % a n d § a t 2 5 % . W e ig h t in g t h e s e e q u a t io n s w it h c a p it a l- la b o r r a t io im p ro v e s t h e e ﬃ c ie n c y o f t h e e s t im a t e s.

30

6.2

Appendix II

rτ =

−(1 − β)qp
−(1 − β)Q
=
<0
(1 − τ )K
(1 − τ )k

dlp /dτ =

−(1 − β)qp
<0
αβ

(1)

(2)

(β − τ)qp
d(τ qp )
=
dτ
β(1 − τ )

(3)

qp = kβ lp1−β

(4)
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